A Russian comeback

Abstract

The recent developments in Ukraine, and more specifically, Russia’s accession of Crimea have once again placed Russia on the top of the international agenda and, subsequently, on the top of US Foreign Policy Makers’ to-do list. In the wake of Russia’s movements along the borders of Crimea, and a referendum that resulted in an alleged astounding majority in favour of accession to Russia, the United States and its Western partners appeared shocked and helpless. Meanwhile, President Putin justified these events by drawing on comparisons with Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. These developments resulted in the culmination of tensions in US-Russian relations that had been souring over the past few years. With regard to developments in Ukraine and the secession of Crimea, the administration and foreign policy elite within the United States have acknowledged that these events were unforeseen and unexpected, “they didn’t see it coming”, and they appeared at a loss with regard to structuring and working towards a feasible way forward. In the meantime, the media has been quick to speculate as to whether the current crisis is symptomatic of a “New Cold War” or a “New World Order” that is characterised by tensions between the United States and Russia. Yet rather than pre-empting the emergence of a “New World Order” or “New Cold War”, this paper will argue that these developments should be assessed within a broader historical and strategic context. Russia-US relations have long been characterised by cycles of tension, followed by efforts to re-set, re-start, or re-boot the relationship. In order to understand these cycles, and particularly the current period in US-Russian relations, I will argue that an understanding of these two countries’ strategic cultures provides a useful framework for understanding the prisms through which their strategies, policies and behaviour develop.