Challenging the decisions of the attorney general : a critical analysis

Abstract

This dissertation delves into the powers wielded by the Attorney General (AG), exploring the administrative law principles governing the AG's statutory powers. The study questions whether the AG's discretion aligns with Maltese Administrative Law and assesses the judicial review procedures under Article 469A and Article 469B of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure. The author concludes that prior to Article 469B, judicial review of the AG was feasible under Article 469A. When the two remedies are compared, Article 469B stands to be a more restrictive remedy, due to the impositions of tighter time limits, stricter rules of standing, and more restricted grounds of review. The dissertation also discusses the element of secrecy within the AG’s use of discretion. In several instances, victims do not have a right to be informed of decisions of nolle prosequi or that an in genere inquiry is concluded, and thus rendering the remedies available for challenging the AG’s discretion unattainable. Moreover, parliamentary scrutiny over the AG has throughout the years declined. Therefore, the AG’s exercise of discretion is opaque. The dissertation concludes by emphasising the need for effective judicial review over prosecutorial discretion. It underscores the necessity of transparency in upholding the rights of victims of crime and advocates for measures to bolster accountability in the AG's exercise of discretion.