Intentions matters, then and now

Abstract

Are intentions mental states? What is it to intend doing something? Are intentions a necessary condition for free choice? If yes, is the exercise of free will always necessitated by an intention? On the other hand, what is the relationship between voluntariness and intentionality? Can there be agency without intentionality? Are intentions shareable? These questions capture a good deal of the current canonical list of philosophical themes that have occupied certain circles of philosophy in the last eighty years or so. The topic of intention itself has enjoyed some prestige within analytic philosophy ever since G.E.M. Anscombe published her seminal work, Intention in 1957. It cannot be fortuitous that she then went on to publish her other seminal essay, Modern Moral Philosophy in the following year. However, the very broad philosophical territory covered by the elenchus of questions presented above shows that the discussion about intention and intentionality engages the attention of metaphysics, mind, epistemology, action while also offering significant wisdom related to the important consequences impacting upon moral philosophy. Indeed, this would have probably been Anscombe’s ultimate concern. The way these pertinent questions are settled reflects on one’s sympathy or antipathy towards the neo-Humean belief/desire-based model of action or not. The positions I shall be reviewing below share the view that desire does not come close to establishing the status required for something to qualify as an intention since something more is necessary in order to both justify and explain the causal commitment that exists between agent and agency. [excerpt]