On the derivation of an ought from an Is : the stakes of Alphonso Lingis’ moral realism

Abstract

On the Derivation of an Ought from an Is: The Stakes of Alphonso Lingis’ Moral Realism – In this paper, I construct a systematic approach to Alphonso Lingis’ take on the «is/ought problem», namely the question of whether it is possible to derive normativity from being or moral imperatives from facts. I show that his solution to the problem involves the three-pronged system. First, Lingis is shown to be a champion of realism in his recognition that beings themselves throw their weight around by issuing directives for action. Second, I show how sensibility’s subservience to the demands of the imperative is not enough, since one must also be able to appropriate and channel its force via what Lingis terms passionate states. Finally, I explore how the investment in an object of passion brings the intrinsic importance of the thing to the fore in order to guide the subject toward the investment of excess energies.