Resolving parliamentary deadlocks : towards a harmonised process for appointing the chief justice and integrity officers

Abstract

Malta’s democratic framework has been strengthened by provisions requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority for the appointment of specific positions. This requirement enhances public confidence in officeholders, safeguards their independence, and reinforces their legitimacy in fulfilling their duties. However, the process also presents challenges. At times, the absence of the necessary parliamentary consensus results in deadlocks, which may delay essential appointments. Such circumstances can create uncertainty and operational gaps, with existing legal provisions either addressing or, in some cases, failing to address mechanisms for preventing deadlocks. This research examines the appointment procedures of constitutional and integrity institutions that require parliamentary supermajorities. It focuses on the political and legal evolution of these frameworks, the implementation of current appointment legislation, and the potential reform aimed at introducing anti-deadlock measures across various institutions to safeguard their functionality and independence. The study specifically examines the appointment processes of the Chief Justice, the Ombudsman, the Auditor General, the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life, and the Chairperson of the Permanent Commission Against Corruption. The analysis demonstrates that the two-thirds provision is essential for those holding such offices and that there is a strong preference for solutions that preserve this principle. Although views differ on the precise mechanisms to prevent deadlocks, the primary concerns identified are the long-term preservation of the institutions’ independence and legitimacy, while avoiding any vacancy in office. This study concludes by proposing a pathway to achieve these objectives.