A legal analysis of the implications of reforming the decision-making process in the European Council

Abstract

The main objective of this dissertation is to analyse and criticise the legal implications of any reform in the decision-making process of the European Council, the European Union’s core political institution. The author introduces this subject by first delving into the current voting procedure in place in the European Council, centred around consensus and unanimity-based voting mechanisms, as well as defining the qualified majority voting process and its effects. After, it elaborates on jurisprudence effecting legal basis and voting in the institutions, further establishing any legal pathways and constraints to reforming the system in the European Council. The author then seeks to create a comparative analysis with the Council of the European Union, who have already led similar reforms, and the United Nations Security Council, both providing valuable lessons for reform in the European Council. This is then concluded with the impact of voting reform on small Member States, highlighting Malta as the core example of vulnerability under the qualified majority voting system, and suggesting legal protective mechanisms for small Member States. This research identifies a lacuna in European Union law; the discussion of legal repercussions of Treaty reform in the voting process in the European Council, an institution whose tacit veto power has served as a guarantee since the European Union’s conception.