Court delays in criminal proceedings : a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused and the victim

Abstract

‘Justice delayed is justice denied’. The maxim is recited so often in courtrooms that it risks becoming furniture, yet it states, with complete accuracy, the stakes of this dissertation. There are few words more scathing uttered from the lips of lawyers than ‘unfair proceedings’, as a cornerstone of the rule of law, the right to a fair trial is widely recognised as a foundational execution of justice. Courts therefore, are entrusted with the abstruse task of striking a balance between the effective administration of justice and the protection of the rights of the accused and the victim. From the moment a criminal charge is issued, the accused lives under its strenuous weight, his liberty, property, reputation, and peace of mind all struck by the trajectory of proceedings. And the victim of the offence waits, with no less anxiety, for the court to finalise proceedings. A judgement issued too late fails both parties. However, what remedies are provided by our courts once a violation of a person’s right to a fair trial is found? This dissertation examines how the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time established both by legislation and jurisprudence is defined, applied, and remedied in practice. Moreover, before meaningful solutions can be proposed, it is necessary to examine the root causes of judicial delay. What factors contribute to the persistent backlog of criminal proceedings, and why do such delays continue to characterise the administration of justice? More importantly, does every delay amount to a violation of the accused's fundamental right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time, or are there circumstances in which delays are both justified and necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice?