Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/44556
Title: The constitutional rights of a criminal suspect
Authors: Pullicino, Laurence
Keywords: Criminal procedure -- Malta
Civil rights -- Malta
Defense (Criminal procedure) -- Malta
Issue Date: 1973
Citation: Pullicino, L. (1973). The constitutional rights of a criminal suspect (Master's dissertation)
Abstract: The process which leads a person accused of a criminal offence to the height of his ordeal, that is the trial, has its origin much earlier than when he stands in bar. It is precisely when the Police, upon the notification that an offence has been committed, start their inquiries to collect the evidence against the offender, on which the case for the prosecution will later be founded. It is at this stage, perhaps more than in any other, that the criminal suspect should be accorded the protection of safeguards. The Police, being part of the executive branch of government, stand in a different position from the Judiciary. Notwithstanding that their efforts should be directed solely towards the detection of offences and the conviction of offenders, an excess of public spirit and mistaken zeal may unconsciously lead to the adoption by them of methods which whatever the good faith that lies in them, may produce a distorted picture to those who have to judge. This may produce a perverse result and bring about the conviction of innocent persons. This is not to imply that such undesirable zealousness is a common occurrence, but the provision of safeguards will ensure that where there is the danger of its existence, it will be kept in check. The criminal suspect is entitled to treatment which is compatible with his fundamental rights and freedoms. Until he is proved guilty by due process of law his innocence is presumed and he should not be placed in a situation which will make his eventual trial an unfair one. He should not be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment which is repulsive to his human dignity, and which may force him to submit to acts, or to make declarations he will not do if he is not treated that way. The deprivation of personal liberty is only permissible when there is a pronouncement of guilt by the proper tribunal. Before this is forthcoming, the suspect's freedom should only be interfered with when it is absolutely necessary and justified by the reasonable suspicion that he has committed an offence. Even here such infringement will not be arbitrary and unlimited. It will not extend to more than is strictly necessary to enable the law enforcement agencies of the State to discharge their function of investigating offences and collect the evidence required for the establishment of his guilt thus making remedial measures possible. A person has other rights besides liberty, which should be safeguarded" Foremost among these is the privacy of his home, person and other property. These should not be disturbed on the flimsiest of excuses but only if there is the possibility that they may disclose some evidence of the offence. The procuration of one's defence is also another right in which an accused person should not be obstructed. These fundamental rights are generally entrenched in a written Constitution, and to this extent they are also referred to as constitutional rights. This designation is here preferred because it shows their affinity and identification with the highest law of the land. Few will deny that they exist in the interest of society itself which requires respect for the rights of its members just as much at it needs to suppress and punish threats to its existence which criminal offences present. To deprive the people of their rights without justification is to endanger internal peace and security. However they should not be allowed to serve the ends of delinquents who assert infringement of their rights on the least excuse in an attempt to evade punishment for their misdeeds. Their interpretation and application should not be stretched to breaking point because otherwise they will become the tool which criminals will use whenever they are cornered by the police. This will cause their degeneration into instruments of social disorganisation leading ultimately to chaos and the loss of social virtues among the law-abiding citizens. The solution is to strike a proper balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest. Admittedly this is not an easy task and many a time it will present the most complex problems of interpretation. The borderline between the one and the other is not always clear and an attempt at demarcation may only render it more blurred. There may be times when priority must be accorded to public interest, but on other occasions the opposite situation may be expedient: social necessity may warrant inroads upon the domain of the State. In this thesis it is proposed to examine the concept of human rights, called constitutional rights, to which a person under police investigations for a criminal offence, is entitled. A brief survey of the development and present state of the recognition of these rights and the machinery created for their enforcement, with special reference to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Constitution of Malta, will be attempted. Limits to their enjoyment will be considered against a background of several controversies that may exist in that regard.
Description: LL.D.
URI: https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/44556
Appears in Collections:Dissertations - FacLaw - 1958-2009

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