The influence of Greenpeace on EU decision making

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to understand the influence ENGOs have on the decision-making process. With the help of a case study about the controversial REACH directive, this dissertation aims to answer the research questions “How does Greenpeace form public interest and public lobbying in the EU in relation to Green lobbying?” and “What impacts does green lobbying have on proposal drafting?”

The first question was marginally answered, as whereas Greenpeace and ENGOs do seek public help and promote their work in Brussels among the public, it is difficult to assess the direct influence the public has. The literature review gives an overview of the lobbying mechanisms in the EU. The context surrounding legislation is a large factor in whether ENGOs and other lobbying groups are successful. The first question is further analysed in the data, as ENGOs have marginally smaller budgets, than business lobbyist, thus suggesting their strength in lobbying lies within the public affiliation towards them.

Most of the data is acquired through qualitative methods. With the help of a wealth of reports, articles and newspapers this thesis provides an overview of the REACH regulation, from both chemical and the environmental lobbying groups. The case study provides an interesting perspective on the second question. The influence each respective lobbying group had on REACH was analysed to discern to what extent the regulation changed from its original white paper. The case study paints a picture of a lobbying frenzy, led by both the Chemical industry and ENGOs respectively. Greenpeace had 4 key points it felt were required it needed for the REACH regulation to sustain its integrity. When we contrast these with the final REACH regulation, it shows, despite the financial advantages and better political influence over ENGOs like Greenpeace, they only marginally succeeded in changing legislation in their favour.

The final findings of this dissertation shows a healthy presence of ENGOs in Brussels. It is clear that they are able to serve as a watchdog over legislators, and dampen the overarching power industrial lobbyist are claimed to have. Further studies into the area would further give insight into the possible implications EU lobbying has on decision making. Since the art of lobbying is dependent on the context surrounding the legislation, a large number of case studies would benefit literature on lobbying.