Towards a common European defence and Malta's security culture

Abstract

Since Malta gained its independence from Britain in 1964 it has tried to address the shortfall in its capabilities and capacity for providing territorial security through multilateralism (Pace 2013). This is still true today although accession to the European Union in 2004 has changed the way national defence and security is pursued due to Europeanisation (Major 2005). These changes to the domestic level are an understudied area (Klein 2014); even more so in the Maltese context. A new impetus towards further development in Common European Defence has been provided by the Member States and the Commission (Council 2018) but the motivations for support among larger Member States and at EU level are found not to be of consequence to Malta; Russian aggression on Europe’s Eastern borders, increasing defence capabilities, and the economic benefits derived from the defence industry. Malta’s geographical location in the Mediterranean, the lack of military industry, and external security guarantees indicate that there are other determinants at play. The aim of this research has been to find out Malta’s likelihood to cooperate, participate and join in further integration with Common European Defence. Strategic culture, posture and norms were used as determinants of Malta’s cooperation in EU defence structures. By analysing the perceptions of the political elite in Malta, through qualitative research and semi-structured interviews, it is shown that Malta has converged in three out of five of Meyer’s (2006) strategic norms; (ii) agreement on humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, (iii) a stronger role for the EU but without ceding sovereignty, (iv) agreement on desirability of UN authorisation. Although Malta seems not to have done so with regards to; (i) the de-prioritisation of territorial defence, and (v) a general preference for civilian over military instruments. Even though Malta ‘does European defence’, its participation in the EU defence structures is minimal. This further confirms that Malta has converged to one of three groups of European Countries categorised by Biehl, Giegerich et al. (2013); those ‘whose security and defence policy is driven by the attempt to manifest their own presence in the international system’. This further reinforces the idea that Malta is somewhat in line with the EU strategic culture and norms. The ‘wait and see’ approach taken by the Maltese government regarding Permanent Structured Cooperation, owing to the narrative of a European Army, indicates that neutrality is still a precondition to further cooperation in Common European Defence even though PESCO itself is not perceived as a threat to neutrality by the political elite. In sum, strategic culture, posture and norms in Malta seem to be in line with Common European Defence, although not across the board, while the creation of a putative European Army is perceived as an obstacle to further cooperation and damaging to Malta’s neutrality.