To what extent is the doctrine of positive obligations adopted in relation to the right to life?

Abstract

The right to life is one of the most intrinsic human rights. Paired with the doctrine of positive obligations, it extends an all-encompassing protection to all individuals placed in vulnerable positions. However, is this an overarching notion or are there limitations to its applicability? This will be examined through an analysis of the relevant legislative provisions — Article 2 ECHR, as well as Article 33 of the Constitution of Malta — and a close examination of jurisprudence. Obligations will be a focal point in this paper. An overall evaluation of the different types of obligations that exist will be drawn up, thus leading to the exploration of the doctrine of positive obligations. Through this intensive study, critical emphasis will be placed upon the different kinds of protection demanded from the State, namely protection in the scheme of action by law enforcement bodies, protection from any dangerous acts of the authorities, and protection from acts of third parties. There will also be the inclusion of anomalies and discussions relating to controversial issues, particularly those associated with the unborn child, the right to die as well as suicide and self-harm. These will help formulate a cognitive perspective and distinction between what is considered as a duty of the State and what is not. All of this will in turn aid in reaching a conclusion pertaining to the title question.