The crime of perjury

Abstract

The whole machinery of the law-courts, whether civil or criminal, has for its object the determination of the questions of law and fact involved in the matter before them. There were days when the presiding judge was free to give or abstain from giving judgment as he thought fit. This state of affairs was happily brought to an end as the disadvantages it brought about became more and more realized, and the rule came into being – and it is now commonplace – that the presiding judge in a court cannot abstain from delivering judgment. The judge can only come to a conclusion, and so decide the case before him, after hearing and examining the evidence before the court. Hence the importance which is attached to evidence and to the rules by which it is governed. Indeed, it has been said that of all the rules of procedure, none can be so useful and essential for the administration of justice as those which regulate evidence. It is by no means recently that this has been realized. The history of law shows all along the great care by which law-makers were at all times animated in creating and developing the rules of evidence. They well knew that evidence, as the main source of proof before the courts, should be protected by the strongest safeguards of truth and sincerity. With this aim in view, many countries formulated laws which not only where strict regards the competency of witnesses but also provided severe punishments for those who gave false evidence. Before proceeding further, a general definition of the crime of perjury may be attempted, leaving the detailed explanation of it for a later stage. Generally, one may say that this crime can only be committed by witnesses, experts and interpreters during the hearing of a case in court by saying thing on oath which they know to be false. This general notion of the crime is not only the one which is accepted by most modern laws, but also that, it seems, which most legislators of all times had substantially in mind.