The right to life of people with mental disabilities : reconsidering abortion and euthanasia

Abstract

The right to life is one of the most comprehensively guaranteed Human Rights. It is no absolute right but the whole of it, including its restrictively interpreted exceptions, is non-derogable, meaning no justification for its violation is possible, not even in times of public emergency. Despite this comprehensive protection of the right to life, abortion and euthanasia are not automatically violations of it but instead, they seem to lie beyond the scope of the right to life. However, where abortion and euthanasia are allowed, their applications must not discriminate. Despite this fact, most of the world's permissive abortion laws do discriminate against people with disabilities, even though the discrimination is difficult to prove because the foetus is not protected by Human Rights Law. Simultaneously, most formal or informal applications of euthanasia, to people not competent to request the practice themselves, discriminate against them. They base the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment on quality of life judgements that are not legitimately possible in Human Rights logic. A state which tolerates these practices is in violation of its duties to protect the right to life, to accord special protection to the vulnerable and not discriminate against them and to prevent discrimination by third parties.