Hersch Lauterpacht and early formulations of crimes against humanity

Abstract

Crimes against humanity first emerged in international law in 1945, when the allied powers that won World War II—the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France—granted the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg jurisdiction to prosecute German leaders for ‘crimes against peace,’ ‘war crimes,’ and ‘crimes against humanity.’ Since the Nuremberg trials, the concept of crimes against humanity has expanded dramatically, which other essays in this volume describe. Most notably, as highlighted in the next essay in this volume, international law has now affirmed that, unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity may be committed in times of formal peace. As William Schabas has put it, many colloquially view crimes against humanity as being analogous to serious violations of human rights, but ‘in the case of breaches of international human rights law, it is the state that is held responsible, whereas in the case of crimes against humanity, individuals are the perpetrators and they are the ones who are held criminally responsible.’ Thus, violations of human rights might trigger orders to cease certain actions or compensate victims, but violations of crimes against humanity can lead to the imprisonment of state officials, and even heads of state