A critical analysis of UEFA's financial fair play regulations and their relationship with EU competition law

Abstract

This dissertation analyses the structure of the FFP, and their relationship with EU law. It explores several notable challenges of EU compatibility, as well as the Commission’s reactions. The FFP represents UEFA’s response to decades of irresponsible overspending in football. The dissertation examines the regulations themselves, primarily how the break-even analysis is calculated by ensuring that clubs’ relevant expenses do not exceed the relevant income over the three-year monitoring period. The deviation allowance, as well as the wide criteria for what constitutes ‘income’, represent beneficial efforts to facilitate the application of the regime. To understand their implementation, reference is made to the enforcement structure of the FFP, focusing on the procedure of the CFCB’s investigatory and adjudicatory chambers, including some cases decided by the latter. A number of landmark cases of the CAS were examined, highlighting the appeal process from the CFCB. Sport law’s relationship with EU law is another focus of this work. Cases such as Bosman, Meca-Medina, and Walrave are referred to in order to explain how EU law became prevalent over sports law, specifically, those regulations made by sporting federations, like the FFP. In order to operate lawfully, the FFP must conform with EU law. The dissertation examines Article 101 TFEU’s three limbs, showing how the FFP seemingly breaches it due to a restriction of investments. Reference is also made to the exceptions to this article, found in 101(3) and Wouters, showing that the regulations do not enjoy their protection. These findings conclude that the FFP are problematic vis-a-vis EU law, and that there are more proportionate approaches which could be adopted to reach their aims among European clubs. Their unencumbered operation arises out of UEFA and the EU’s cordial relationship.