Russia's post-communist foreign policy with its 'near abroad' : between cooperation and domination

Abstract

The forces of change unleashed by Gorbachev by the beginning of 1990 created what Skak calls a 'revolutionary syndrome of mass political participation'. What Gorbachev called 'the third stage of the perestroika years' ( 1990-1991) saw a struggle that unleashed social, national and political forces. In fact Gorbachev asserts; 'By the end of 1990 the very future of our society was being questioned: should the Soviet Union continue?' These fears of the eventual dissolution of the USSR, which itself was based on a Union dictated by ideology, were voiced in the president's New Year greeting to the Soviet people in 1991. Evidently struggling to find a reason for a renewed Union based on what he called 'common values acquired during the Soviet years', Gorbachev tried to appeal to a sense of (imposed) unity that no longer was alive. It is interesting here to mention some of the events concluding 1990, events which evidence Gorbachev's last drastic attempts to salvage some sort of new Union. One such event was the proposal by Gorbachev himself on November 17 to propose a new Soviet government, consisting of representatives from all fifteen republics, to be called the Soviet Council of the Federation. Although this proposal was accepted, resulting in the Draft Treaty of a new union, to be called the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics, it was obvious that such measures did not do much to resolve both the internal dissent within government or the vortex pushing towards disintegration. By December 17, this chaos pushed an increasingly cornered Gorbachev to assert that the country needed firm executive rule to overcome what he considered as the threat posed by 'the dark forces of nationalism'. This action by Gorbachev led to a succession of problems that would not only exasperate an already critical situation and that would also lead to the resignation of foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze. An action taken on the bases of fears of "the threat of a new dictatorship". There followed also the subsequent military interventions in Latvia and Lithuania - actions considered to be counter to earlier asserted principles of self-determination, and self-restraint in the conduct of international relations, cornerstone principles of 'new thinking'. It is my impression, however, that these ideals and policies were, and are still today, only relevant to the 'far abroad'; actions taken in the 'near abroad' even up to this day lie on a set of different rules.