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https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/90666| Title: | Fortresses of the cross : Hospitaller military architecture, 1136-1798 |
| Authors: | Spiteri, Stephen C. |
| Keywords: | Malta -- History -- Knights of Malta, 1530-1798 Fortification -- Malta -- History Military engineering -- Malta Military architecture -- Malta |
| Issue Date: | 1994 |
| Publisher: | Heritage Interpretation Services |
| Citation: | Spiteri, S. C. (1994). Fortresses of the cross : Hospitaller military architecture, 1136-1798. Malta: Heritage Interpretation Services. |
| Abstract: | There are two important considerations in military architecture, the choice of the site and the choice of the building to place on that site. Throughout their long history, the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem showed an extraordinary aptitude in employing military engineers to make wise decisions over both these choices. There can be few comparable examples of an organisation displaying such single mindedness of approach throughout almost the whole of its long history. The history of the Knights is a history of fortifications. That is why this book is so important, for it is the first comprehensive attempt to explain and assess the total military -achievement in the construction of fortresses by this remarkable body of men. They exerted a profound influence over many generations on the development of defensive warfare. Also, although it is not the subject of this book, they were effective, particularly at sea, in offensive warfare. Stephen Spiteri has the ability to encapsulate this extraordinary contribution, both in words and pictures. His drawings are an integral part of the thesis, each capable of contributing a mine of information for which, to cover adequately, most authors would need pages of written text. The vicissitudes of the techniques of defence in the evolution of military architecture from the medieval to the baroque can be . traced in these pages in the work of this remarkable Order of Knights. In an age of fine cartography and aerial photography we may find it difficult to appreciate the problems facing an engineer who has only his experienced eyes to ensure he recommended a suitable tract of land as a base of operations. In the Holy Land, their castles were required to be impregnable to attack but also to act as administrative centres for the farming of the areas around them. A castle had to be able to communicate with its neighbour and rapidly pass on vital information. And it had to be sustainable as an economic base, both for the protection of its inmates and the security of the area against hostile inroads. Marqab and Crac are model examples of the latest techniques of their day and role models for many of the castles built later in western Europe. They were secure against all but intrigue or mining. The choice of St. Jean d'Arce, known more commonly to us as Acre, as a final fall back position, the sort of Dunkirk of the Holy Land, was propitious. No better site on the coast could have been chosen. A peninsula, secure on two sides by sea against an enemy without a powerful navy, it thus had a shortened land front which rose up on a slight eminence over the plain. There the defences could be concentrated. However, even they, strong though they were, proved incapable of withstanding the onslaught delivered by Al-Ashraf, backed by an overwhelming force of cavalry and infantry and aided by adequate artillery. Bickering and rivalry in the so-called Christian camp, lack of reinforcements and the abstention of the Genoese did not help. But the place stood long enough to allow ships to evacuate the leaders and many of the wealthy population who could bribe the sailors. Rhodes was chosen for its existing facilities, its good port and fertile hinterland at a time when the Turks did not possess a powerful navy and when the flank was still securely held by a Christian emperor at Constantinople. And for many years Rhodes served the Knights well. As the threat increased so did their military preparations. By the early years of the sixteenth century, when the nature of war had been revolutionised by the introduction of gunpowder-firing cannon with which the Turks were well provided, the fortifications of Rhodes had been re-constructed to include all the latest techniques in military architecture to counter that threat. Devices like the projecting gun-platform designed to flank its adjoining curtain walls, in embryo, the pentagonal serrated walls to increase flanking gun fire, and the curving of the battlements to deflect enemy cannon balls - all these devices were introduced in their early stages of development by the Knights. In 1522, they faced a formidable barrage of artillery and for that they were well prepared. It was not the Turkish guns that broke their defences, but a new weapon with an immense destructive power - the explosive mine. Given the conditions of the terrain there was little they could do to withstand this force, but they managed to persuade that brilliant military engineer, Gabriele Tadino, to desert his Venetian masters and join them at Rhodes. His exertions delayed the Turks and might have been successful if they had struck to their earlier practice and raised the siege with the oncoming of winter. Instead the Turks fought a winter campaign and won. With the package granted to them by the King of Spain came Tripoli, a site the Knights would not have chosen of their own free will and one they were to relinquish to a Turkish attack after an acrimonious defence. Malta was another matter. From the time their commissioners submitted their report to the attack of Fort St. Elmo in 1565, the Knights knew that their ideal site for a strongly defended city and headquarters lay on the Sciberras peninsula and only lack of funds prevented them from developing it before the Great Siege. Instead, they had to accept the limitations of that small peninsula on which the Turks could advantageously mount their guns. The epic story of the Turkish defeat is well known. Victory for the Knights was only made possible by the sacrifice of Fort St. Elmo to buy valuable time, by the brilliant defence of Birgu and Senglea, using retrenchments or fall-back positions to absorb the punches, and by the timely arrival of reinforcements from Sicily. With victory came the opportunity to build a new capital, to be called Valletta. The site was near perfect, although it had a few minor disadvantages. It consisted of a long narrow peninsula from which guns could cover the two fine harbours that lay astride it. The land front was narrow and strong with fortifications of the latest Italian design placed on higher ground. As the years unfolded, more and more rings of defences encircled the citadel so as to make it, with an adequate garrison, almost indestructible. If it finally fell to the French armies, it was not through any failure of its fortifications, but from a lack of resolve on the part of those who were called upon to defend it, weakened by a fifth column within. A mere glance at the drawings in this book causes one to wonder at the immense energy of so small a band of warriors in fashioning and constructing such a formidable collection of fortified buildings from the small castle or tower to the elaborate enceintes of fairly large cities. They demonstrate the ingenuity and vigour displayed by a group of human beings drawn together in defence of a common ideal and. usually, working together under extreme pressure. This book is a tribute to them and an inspiration to us. |
| URI: | https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/90666 |
| ISBN: | 9990996539 |
| Appears in Collections: | Scholarly Works - FacBenHA |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fortresses_of_the_Cross_Hospitaller_Military_Architecture_1136-1798_1994.pdf Restricted Access | 131.14 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open Request a copy |
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