Art and knowledge

Abstract

In the introduction to his book, The Story of Art, Gombrich writes, "Art with a capital A has no existence." What he is implying with this statement is that art is an open concept, the definition of which varies according to both time and place. The effort to arrive at an absolute theory of art has failed in many respects due to the overlooking of the above stated fact. Philosophers of art have usually focused on a specific aspect of art and looked at it as a source for bringing out art's essential nature, while neglecting numerous other aspects that also form the core of the sphere of artistic creation. For that reason, all theories of art, which claimed to have been able to bring out art's essential nature, had been easily reproached by the raising of very simple questions. An excellent example of a theory of art that is quite easily reproachable is the pleasure theory. Its adherents claim that the value of art lies in its ability to provide enjoyment and pleasure for its audience. This claim is easily refutable on a number of grounds. However, one need not go further than ask how this view would account for the "evaluative distinctions that are made between art and non-art in the cultural and educational institutions of our society." There are many things in this world that serve as a source of pleasure, but not many of them are considered art, nor are they given the same value as works of art. This view does not in any way distinguish between art and entertainment, nor does it give any great insight into the nature of art. This is not, however, to deny that one may find pleasure and enjoyment through experiencing a work of art, but simply to point out that the provision of pleasure does not in any way set apart artworks from other objects and events that provide the same. There are other theories, such as expressivism and the representationalist theory of art, which are found insufficient on similar grounds. That art can convey emotion is an indubitable fact, but cannot be universally applied to all works of art. Nor can one claim that all artworks represent nature. We need only take the example of architecture or music to prove our point. All this serves to point out that one cannot claim to have developed an absolute theory of art, precisely because art itself is not an absolute and immutable concept, but a dynamic one. Laws cannot be applied to something that possesses a dynamic nature; at most, one can hope for approximations. In this essay, Twill examine the relation of art to knowledge, but in a different manner than that of the theory of aesthetic cognitivism. This theory has usually been reproached on its insistence that art serves as a mode of understanding, similar to science, in that it carries information. This leads to the evaluation of works of art in relation to truth. However, the internal relation between form and content in a work of art does not always correspond to any external relation to be found outside the artwork. The usual formulation of the theory, which defines art as a source of understanding, implies "that if art is to enhance our understanding of the world, the two must stand in some sort of correspondence relation." This is not necessarily the case. Unity of form and content is a special characteristic of works of art, and is a characteristic that external reality lacks. For that reason, we cannot start with the assumption that the specificity of art lies in its ability to internally correspond to the external world. Rather, the aim of this essay is to show that an artwork manifests internally - namely, within the bounds of the artwork itself - the relationship between man's subjective being and objective reality. In that respect, we can speak of art as a middle path between religion and science. This is best exemplified by Lukacs, who speaks of religion as the first subjective alienation of man: Thus, religion's connection with objective reality is really a reflection of man's alienation from it through the resulting distorted emotions. In religion both the central subject and the medium of reflection are only man's subjective being. Art, on the other hand is a reflection of the whole man (subjective and objective) because it is the result of mental work, of an observation of man's deeply rooted relationship with the many facets of the physical world. Lukacs' statement cannot be taken for granted, but it shows the direction that will be taken in the writing of this essay. It is my belief that aesthetic theory since Hegel is irreversible, but this does not mean that it is not transitory. Some notable developments in philosophy since Hegel and Lukacs, such as Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, can serve to further illuminate the above statement. From Aristotle onwards, the notion that man can know himself only through his own actions becomes a rarely questioned fact. This assumption will be a crucial factor for the rest of this essay. The examination of art in the above context requires an analysis of consciousness, the proper treatment of which first appears in Hegel's philosophy. For that reason, I have decided to first examine Hegel's notion of self-consciousness in the context of the dialectic of the master and slave relation. If Aristotle is right that "wisdom is knowledge having to do with certain principles and causes", then our investigation would have to begin with man's consciousness, since without it art would not exist. Rather than try to outline the essence of the concept of art and in that way attempt the impossible, the goal of this investigation is to prove the centuries-old claim that art is most importantly of all just one among the activities that serve as an affirmation of man's existence and therefore man's self-awareness.