The Mahanian trap : Mahan, Japan and the Pacific War

Abstract

At the turn of the century, Japanese sea power theory was in a state of orphanhood. Coming out from two and a half centuries of isolation, Japan had no deep seafaring, naval tradition to propel it as it took its first steps out of isolation and tried to establish itself as a great power and a maritime Empire. Instead, it adopted the theories of American sea power theorist, strategist, and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, the most popular sea power theorist of his age. This put Japan, firmly, on the path to war with the United States.

In the run up to the Second World War, events would further push Japan towards Mahan. As Japan sailed from one victory to the next, first, in the First Sino-Japanese War and then in the Russo-Japanese War, it reinforced its convictions about Mahan. Japan became more convinced that success in any war depended on one, overwhelming victory at sea, and a complex strategy to achieve this. Was this the result of the Japanese emphasising certain lessons from Mahan whilst failing to grasp him in his entirety?

As the dissertation delves into Japanese naval strategy in the lead-up to the Pacific War, the immense influence that Mahanian thought had on Japanese maritime strategists will be discussed. It was a process years in the making and it shaped the Japanese conduct of the war at sea and allowed Japan to claim stunning tactical and operation victories in the first seven months of the war. However, by mid to late 1942, the IJN did not possess the strategic vision to effectively end the war victoriously. Instead, the IJN sat and waited for its ‘perfect’ battle, depleting its strength in ill thought out actions and let the initiative irreversibly slip to the other side. The dissertation argues that this was the result of an unhealthy fixation with certain aspects of Mahan.