The presumption of innocence and reverse onus provisions in Maltese law

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in the light of reverse onus provisions in Maltese and foreign law, A problematic issue which arises in several jurisdictions such as in the United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa and Malta, concerns the assessment of reverse onus provisions in relation to the presumption of innocence. In order to delve deeper into this vexata quaestio, three provisions of the Official Secrets Act and a provision in the Interpretation Act of Malta are singled out with a view to establishing whether they do, and, if so, to what extent do they contravene the presumption of innocence rule contained in the Constitution of Malta and in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Due consideration is also given to Maltese and foreign case law on the subject under discussion and the relevance of such jurisprudential activity to the interpretation by Maltese, British, Canadian and South African courts, and the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, of the provisions under examination. In sum, it is concluded that there are indeed some instances where the presumption of innocence might be infringed by the provisions of the said Maltese legislation.