Relative humanity versus ethical consistency in the application of human rights

Abstract

The Palestinian/Israeli conflict refers not only to a struggle over land, and historical claims, but encompasses a struggle over terminology, ethical conduct, and morality towards the occupied or conquered. This article examines Israeli policy narratives, which have influenced legislation and adjudication, thus creating in the long run an acceptance within Israeli politics and society at large of the normality of perceiving the Palestinian as less human. This doubtlessly contributes to growing moral inconsistency, as relativising the humanity of Palestinians promotes the violation of their fundamental rights. The core of the argument rotates around one very basic yet paramount issue: the denial off undamental human rights can always be attributed to a belief in or practice of relative humanity. The basic premise of Universalist discourses on human rights is moral consistency regardless of ethnic identity, gender, racial ties, or religious beliefs. Rights are violated systematically and intentionally because the other, in this case the "Palestinian", is perceived as being less human, thus supposedly meriting less rights. The article sheds more light on relative humanity, ultimately reinforcing and promoting a culture of tolerance towards violations, which are rarely condemned or criticised.