Absolutism of value and relativity of morals in the foundations of human rights

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the problem of the foundations of human rights. In order to undertake this task, I have turned to the phenomenological theory of value of Max Scheler. Firstly, a description is included of the contemporary "apotheosis of value", focusing on the risk that this implies for the accurate development of the philosophical foundation of human rights. Following some remarks about phenomenology itself, the theory of value is described, paying particular attention to the link between value and the "ought-to-be", and to the absolute character of the realm of value, confronted with the relativity of historical morals. Finally, some suggestions are offered about the main consequences of this theory in relation to human rights, conceived of as the "ought to be" content: the derivate being of oughtness, which can only be understood in the light of negative values; the need to accept the existence of different ways of understanding human rights, the consequence of different viewpoints regarding the absolute realm of value; the subsistence of an ideal and universal "ought-to-be", destined to coexist with the variations of the "estimative outlines" hidden behind each culture.