G.H. Mead and knowing how to act : practical meaning, routine interaction, and the theory of interobjectivity

Abstract

The general aim of this paper is twofold. First, we evaluate Mead’s later efforts at developing a non-conscious theory of meaning that refutes the primacy of Descartes’s cogito as a foundational explanation of adult human understanding and social interaction. However, paired with this first goal, we also intend to use Mead’s theoretical framework as a paradigmatic example of a theory of intersubjectivity. We will show how Mead problematically reintroduces the presence of conscious awareness in order to provide an intersubjective account of mutual human understanding and interaction. We argue that this position reveals a lacuna in both Mead’s theory of meaning specifically, as well as in theories of intersubjectivity more broadly. Such approaches require a foundational account of practical meaning and knowledge. We conclude by exploring the links between these arguments and the emerging theory of interobjectivity.