Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/82226
Title: | Do financial investors mitigate agency problems? Evidence from an emerging market |
Authors: | Aluchna, Maria Kuszewski, Tomasz |
Keywords: | Stock ownership Administrative agencies Capitalists and financiers -- Case studies |
Issue Date: | 2021 |
Publisher: | University of Piraeus. International Strategic Management Association |
Citation: | Aluchna, M., & Kuszewski, T. (2021). Do financial investors mitigate agency problems? Evidence from an emerging market. European Research Studies Journal, 24(2), 872-888. |
Abstract: | Purpose: The paper aims to identify the monitoring effect by financial investors and their potential role to mitigate agency costs resulting from concentrated and dispersed ownership. Design/Methodology/Approach: Using the sample of 440 companies from the Warsaw Stock Exchange listed in 2010-2014, we examine whether financial investors may mitigate the agency problems of dispersed and concentrated ownership. Findings: We observe that ownership by financial investors is positively correlated with company value. Adding to the debate on the monitoring role of financial investors, we note that investments by control-oriented institutions and portfolio-oriented investors are correlated with higher Tobin’s Q. Practical implications: The results indicate the positive effect of the monitoring by financial investors, which can offset some limitations of insufficient investor protection in emerging markets. Originality: The study is based on a unique sample of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, distinguishing between control-oriented and portfolio-oriented financial investors. |
URI: | https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/82226 |
Appears in Collections: | European Research Studies Journal, Volume 24, Issue 2 |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Do_financial_investors_mitigate_agency_problems.pdf | 354.63 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in OAR@UM are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.